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Introduction 
 
The relationship between security and mega-events has received much attention in 
recent years, particularly after 9/11 where fears of no-warning mass casualty attacks 
perpetrated by international terrorist actors have stimulated ever more detailed and 
pre-emptive security responses. These approaches to event security are now becoming 
relatively standardised as a ‘model’ or ‘blueprint’ for reducing vulnerabilities and 
maximising security at major conferences, cultural festivals and sporting events (inter 
alia Coaffee and Rogers, 2008). Within this context, this chapter examines the form, 
function and impact of London’s 2012 security strategy. It identifies and critiques the 
role of surveillance as one of its central features and examines the security operation’s 
relationship with prevailing trends evident in previous Olympic and other mega-
sporting event security practices.  
 
Despite their plural and locally grounded nature, Olympic-related threats are often 
exogenously defined (c.f. Said, 1993) and, in turn, inspire strong continuities and 
commonalities across Olympic security responses over both time and place. This 
paper argues that wider shifts towards ‘total’ security models comprising continually 
reproduced security motifs can be observed. These have occurred generally since the 
terrorist atrocities at Munich (1972) and, particularly, since the International Olympic 
Committee’s (IOC’s) more active role in security planning since the 1984 Winter 
Games in Sarajevo. In turn, these strategies institute Olympic ‘spaces of exception’ 
that have become standardised, mobile and globalised. These rebordered spaces 
ultimately become disassociated from the specific geographical contexts of host cities. 
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The first part of the chapter explores this dynamic in more detail. This is intended to 
serve three functions. First, it establishes the baseline trajectory of standardised 
Olympic security strategies onto which London’s approach is then mapped. Secondly, 
contained within this discussion is the argument that these globalised security 
practices impact unevenly on the idiosyncratic geographies of different Olympic cities 
to which they are applied. This discord is perhaps most clearly articulated around the 
theme of terrorism (the central concern of London 2012 security planning). Here, 
strong commonalities across Olympic security operations contrast with vernacular 
locally-shaped threats. Finally, given the resonance of previous Olympic security 
orthodoxies, alongside the formal mechanisms of transferring learning between host 
cities (see Klauser, this volume), this discussion will locate London’s Olympic 
planning within this much wider, and under-acknowledged, security cycle. In doing 
so, it is hoped that the scope of London’s Olympic security strategy – across bid, 
preparation, development, application and legacy – is captured. 
 
We argue that London’s hosting of the 2012 Olympics both connects with and 
foments different and novel elements to this continuing process of Olympic 
securitisation. In many respects, the English capital already exhibits many of the 
characteristics comprising standardised Olympic security programmes. 2012 security 
begins at a different point than for other hosts. For example, in addition to the often-
cited (and probably outdated) epithet of the world’s most surveilled metropolis, 
London has considerable experience in creating technologically patrolled splintered 
spaces as a foil to terrorism. After establishing this context, the chapter explores the 
more specific anatomy of the 2012 project with particular attention to the role of 
surveillance. This discussion also considers the impact and legacy of the operation. 
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Particularly important here is the contested nature of risk and the legacy of post-event 
retention of security and surveillance structures. Against a historical backdrop of such 
measures repeatedly being pioneered on East Londoners, these mechanisms may 
invest new meaning to the ‘community focused’ discourse surrounding the 2012 
Games. 
 
Olympic (In)securities 
 
Although Olympic-related threats are myriad and complex, after Munich and, 
particularly since 9/11, Olympic security planning has been dominated by the threat 
of terrorism. Taking a broad view, terrorist activity around the Olympics has involved 
myriad forms. Over the last 22 years, for example, these have included perceived 
threats from left-wing groups (Barcelona, 1992 and Athens, 2004), left-wing state 
proxies (Seoul, 1988), right-wing extremists (Atlanta, 1996), ethno-nationalist 
separatists (Calgary, 1988 and Barcelona, 1992), single-issue groups (Albertville, 
1992 and Lillehammer, 1994), hostile states (Seoul, 1988) as well as violent Jihadi 
extremists (Sydney, 2000). Rather than providing an exhaustive and narrative list of 
events, what follows is a brief analysis of some of the broader processes at work and 
their implications for future security planning as they apply to selected Olympiads 
since the late 1980s. 
 
Notwithstanding the prominent and much-discussed attacks at Munich and Atlanta, 
and despite (and possibly because of) the ‘lockdown’ of Olympic sites (Coaffee and 
Fussey 2010), since 1976 much terrorist activity surrounding the Olympics have 
occurred outside of the time and place of the event, most notably at the Seoul and 
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Barcelona Olympiads. More recently the 2004 Games in Athens also experienced 
significant localised terrorist activity in the build up to their Olympiad – the first post-
9/11 Games. 
 
In the case of Seoul, 1988, both the specific geo-political setting (of the two hostile 
nations divided by strained border arrangements) and the geographical features of the 
host nation (that South Korea’s de facto island status meant visitors overwhelmingly 
relied on commercial aviation) combined to generate specific terrorist threats against 
the Games. These threats became manifest when North Korean agents and Japanese 
Red Army proxies targeted the international aviation industry (United Nations 
Security Council, 1988). This culminated in the successful bombing of Korean 
Airlines flight KAL 858 at the cost of 115 lives and a disrupted global campaign 
against Seoul-bound airlines. Although rooted in the geographical and political 
contexts of contemporary South Korea, this campaign drew a global response, both in 
the shape of an unprecedented international Olympic-related intelligence operation 
and the IOC adopting an enhanced diplomatic function. These have become staples of 
subsequent Olympic security projects and enabled the IOC to aggrandize its security 
function and attendant ‘knowledge brokering’ role (Ericson, 1994). 
 
Spanish authorities faced terrorist threats to the 1992 Barcelona Games from three 
fronts between 1986 (following the IOC’s award of the Games) and 1992. These 
originated from the left-wing Grupo de Resistencia Antifascista Primo Octobre 
(GRAPO), Terra Lliure (Catalan separatists), and Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). In 
the run-up to the Games, during 1992 GRAPO conducted five bombings, one small-
arms attack and, demonstrating the symbolic value of Olympic targets, conducted a 
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double bombing of a Catalan oil pipeline the day before the opening ceremony 
(sourced from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)). More localized still were the 
actions of Olympic-opposed Catalan nationalists Terra Lliure. Escalated activity 
comprised 53 attacks (almost exclusively bombings) (sourced from the GTD) 
including targeting banks sponsoring the Games. The most prominent Spanish group, 
ETA, simultaneously undertook a sustained bombing campaign culminating in an 
(media-suppressed) attack on the electricity supply to the opening ceremony (see 
Toohey and Veal, 2007). ETA’s targeting of the Olympics also extended to Madrid’s 
unsuccessful bid to host the 2012 Games. Most directly, this campaign culminated in 
bombing Madrid’s intended Olympic stadium 11 days before the IOC’s final decision 
– or, an attack on the ‘symbol of Madrid’s candidature’ as the Spanish media reported 
it (El Mundo, 2005). Given that different terrorist ideologies influence a varied 
selection of targets (inter alia Drake, 1998; Fussey, 2010 in press), the Olympics 
provide a ready and consistent symbolic target for myriad groups regardless of their 
ideological, operational and tactical diversity.  
 
In the 9/11 era of supposedly ‘international terrorism’ this more localised pattern 
continues. For Athens, 2004, although, Hinds and Vlachou (2007) argue that, in the 
main, the Athenian security project was geared towards external threats, domestic 
threats were most visible. These included the fallout from the conviction of 15 N17 
activists during 2003 and the emergence of the anti-Olympic domestic radical group 
‘Revolutionary Struggle’ (who executed 5 bombings in Athens in the run-up to the 
Games) (sourced from the GTD). 
 
Olympic Threats Reconsidered 
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The above juxtaposition of globalised terrorist risks and the local manifestation of 
threat articulates a wider theme of Olympic insecurity. Despite the conspicuous 
internationalism of the Olympic Games, many of the groups that target them are 
grounded in specific local socio-political contexts (see Fussey et al., 2010 
forthcoming for comprehensive discussion of Olympic threats 1972-2010). Borrowing 
from Said (1993), Olympic threats should perhaps be considered contrapuntally. The 
(potentially imperialistic) imposition of an international event harbouring specific 
values and visions of order stimulates myriad discourses of resistance. Such 
discourses are generated via complex politico-cultural processes and do not easily 
lend themselves to be simply cleaved into exogenous and internationalised categories 
of ‘threat.’ As Said (1993: 19) notes, ‘the world is too small and interdependent’ for 
confrontation to be polarized thus, hence account needs to be made of the confluence 
of global and local elements, as they constitute Olympic threats. It is in this respect 
that the 1972 attack at Munich may be seen as truly exceptional, both in terms of its 
complexity and the importation of activism to the host nation. The state-led murder of 
260 protesters 10 days before the 1968 Mexico City Olympics further underlines the 
novelty of post-1972 emphases on externalised threats. 
 
Olympic Security: Exceptionality and Standardisation 
One of the key drivers behind Olympic security programmes, then, has been a 
‘protectionist reflex’ (Beck, 1999: 153) in response to aforementioned generalised and 
externalised risks. In turn, these risks can be seen to further inform and shape more 
generalised paradigms of security that have been progressively standardised since 
Munich. This process has been further underpinned by a shift in the governance of 
Olympic security throughout the 1980s and the fact that the exceptional nature of such 
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projects entices recourse to previous precedents for which the IOC, as an ‘institutional 
memory,’ is uniquely positioned to broker appropriate knowledge. This is not to 
denote a static process, however, as variations of intensity and form (largely 
depending on the vernaculars of the host’s security infrastructures) do exist as has the 
growing centrality of surveillance within these strategies. Nevertheless, a recurrence 
and reinforcement of key security motifs can be observed.  
 
Such approaches culminate in Olympic ‘spaces of exception’ that seek to delineate 
the Games from their contextual geographies. Comprising these enclaves are myriad 
security strategies, which, although acknowledged, their exegesis lies beyond the 
scope of this paper. As such, the role of surveillance is seen as a particularly central 
feature of these approaches and constitutes the principle site of analysis. To illustrate 
this process, key components of previous security operations are first outlined to serve 
as a baseline to examine the relationship to Olympic security processes at subsequent 
events, including the forthcoming 2012 Games in London. 
 
Responding to Munich: Montreal, 1984 and Seoul Policing 
Sharply contrasting Munich’s ‘low-key’ approach (reflecting contemporary German 
sensitivities over conspicuous public displays of social control), little expense was 
spared on securing the 1976 Olympiad in Montreal. Here, protection from terrorism 
became the key security concern for Montreal’s organising committee (COJO). 
Despite official articulations of ‘discreet efficiency’ Montreal’s strategy was unique 
in scale and placed enormous emphasis on specific strands of security. Central to 
these were preventative measures, a strong and visible presence of security forces, 
and particular emphasis on enhanced and integrated surveillance, communication and 
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decision-making measures (which had been a major failing at Munich and, later, at 
Atlanta). Specific measures included isolated transport security corridors, enhanced 
accreditation requirements for site workers and, crucially, probably the first 
widespread and systematic deployment of CCTV to feature at an Olympics (COJO, 
1976). Electronic surveillance was duly given a central role, as articulated in the 
Official report of the Games, 
 
it was agreed that the best way to deter suspected trouble-makers was … [one] 
that would leave no doubt in their minds they were under continual close 
surveillance. (COJO, 1976: 559) 
 
Costing US$100m (equivalent to around US$380m today) such techniques became 
staple features of subsequent Olympic security strategies and mark the increasing 
prominence of electronic surveillance.  
 
The baton of technological innovation was transferred to the next Olympiad, the XIII 
Winter Games at Lake Placid (1980). Here, the most advanced technological 
measures ever used at an Olympics were deployed. Taking advantage of the particular 
geography that allowed many Winter Games to be physically separated from their 
surroundings, many of the innovations involved the surveillance and strengthening of 
perimeters. In doing so, 12ft high touch sensitive fencing, voice analysers, “bio-
sensor” dogs, ground radar, night vision and CCTV were installed (LPOOC, 1980). 
Together, these represented innovations on surveillance and security practices used to 
secure military sites and airports and became strategies emulated at subsequent 
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Olympics. Such was the securitisation of this environment at Lake Placid, the legacy 
of the Olympic village was that it was converted into a correctional facility (Ibid.).  
 
This cross-pollination of security also transcended ideological barriers. For example, 
during 1980, a ‘Moscow Doppler’ can be observed whereby previous security themes 
– such as the deployment of US-made security apparatus including metal detectors 
and x-ray scanners (used at previous Games, including at Lake Placid during the same 
year) – were incorporated whilst newer approaches were refined - such as zero-
tolerance style policing approaches and exclusion orders - that featured at subsequent 
Games, notably Sydney and Beijing (albeit with variations of scale). The 
militarisation of Olympic security has also continued, as evinced (particularly) during 
the Seoul, Barcelona, Athens and Beijing Games. A further component of these 
broader strategies has been private security, deployed at Tokyo (1964), refined at 
Lake Placid and established on a grand scale at Los Angeles (1984).  
 
Olympic security following 9/11 
Since 2001, Olympic and major sporting event security strategies have reproduced 
and built-upon these themes. Echoing Ball and Webster’s (2004) argument that 
security antecedents have been intensified, rather than replaced by 9/11, what has 
shifted since 2001 has been the scale, technological innovation and centrality of 
surveillance strategies to overall Olympic security planning. Rather than constituting 
a simplistic expression of technophillia, this commitment to distanciated electronic 
surveillance is also seen by practitioners to harmonise with the IOC’s (often 
abandoned) aim of projecting the Games as an athletic event and not an exercise in 
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security. This trend is particularly apparent in relation to the Athens and Beijing 
Olympic security programmes. 
 
Despite being the smallest country to host Olympics since 1952, the Greek Olympics 
set out the most expensive, elaborate and extensive security programme ever 
deployed at the Games. Indeed, this first post-9/11 summer Olympiad provides an 
exemplar (and possibly the apotheosis) of the ‘total security’ paradigm. Quintupling 
Sydney’s security costs, Greece spent $1.5Bn on the Athenian security project (inter 
alia Hinds and Vlachou, 2007). Although partly attributable to a limited extant 
security infrastructure prior to the Games (particularly when compared to London), 
much of this cost can be connected to post 9/11 perceptions of vulnerability and 
heavy commitments to technological surveillance (see Samatas, 2007; this volume for 
authoritative accounts of Athens’ exorbitant yet flawed security model). 
 
The IOC’s decision to award the XXIX Olympiad to Beijing in July 2001 stimulated a 
monumental programme of Olympic-related security development. Particularly 
interesting is how it juxtaposes standardised security practices with the specific 
confluence of global and national processes at that distinct time. In one respect, 
Beijing’s strategy was facilitated by the state’s immense power to mobilise security 
(as experienced by the totalitarian Moscow and reforming Seoul Olympiads). At the 
same time, ‘Dengist’ notions of ‘socialism with Chinese characters’ (Cook, 2007) – or 
a state-oriented yet liberalised economy receptive to specific currents of globalisation 
– enabled the infrastructure and machinery of security to be imported whilst requiring 
that the global media market export specific brand images of the city.  
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Technological security measures included embedding Radio Frequency Identification 
(RFID) tags in some event tickets (such as the opening ceremonies) that allowed their 
holders’ movements to be monitored. Despite these headline-catching technologies, 
principal emphasis rested on more prosaic surveillance camera networks. Initiatives 
include the ‘Grand Beijing Safeguard Sphere,’ the construction and integration of a 
city-wide surveillance camera system that some sources (Security Products, 2007) 
claim cost over $6Bn. This and related initiatives has led to estimates that Beijing 
now hosts over 300 000 public surveillance cameras (inter alia Los Angeles Times, 
2007). China’s recent trend towards hosting international mega-events has also driven 
surveillance camera deployment across other cities, including Shanghai (hosting 
‘Expo 2010’) and Guangzhou (the 2010 Asian Games). These developments have 
further catalysed a nationwide ‘Safe Cities’ programme to establish surveillance 
cameras in 600 cities (New York Times, 2007). Overall, such developments have 
probably allowed China to claim Britain’s dubious accolade of the planet’s most 
intensely observed nation.  
 
Reflecting on Olympic Security, 1976-2008 
Since 1976, in responding to the risk of asymmetrical and potentially catastrophic 
terrorist attacks, Olympic security strategies have become increasingly standardised 
over temporal, national and ideological borders. The components of these strategies 
can be seen to comprise a heavy commitment to preventative measures, situational 
crime prevention (particularly in relation to environmental and architectural design), 
zero-tolerance style policing, private security, enhanced access controls to Olympic 
sites, and a central commitment to technological surveillance. Together these 
inaugurate Olympic imprints – what we might term ‘spaces of exception’ that are 
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delineated from their host agglomerations. As Agamben (2005: 1) noted in his 
seminal work on exceptionality, while such conditions are legitimated via their 
seemingly provisional nature, they operate within ‘a no-mans land between public law 
and political fact.’ Once established, such states become sedimented as they 
‘transform …exceptional measure into a technique of government’ (Ibid.: 2). 
Although referring to conditions of governance, the same may be said for places. 
Indeed, as Boyle and Haggerty (2009) have noted, such rebordering practices now 
extend to non-event IOC activities as illustrated by the Committee’s recent conference 
in Guatemala City which resulted in its host neighbourhood being cordoned off and 
its borders patrolled by armed and militarised police. 
 
This standardisation of practice is also due to extend to future events (as evinced in 
the familiar components to Rio de Janeiro’s 2016 security plan, see Rio2016). These 
consistencies also apply to London 2012 as the current Mayor of London, Boris 
Johnson recently made clear to a Parliamentary Culture, Media and Sport Committee 
hearing: 
 
broadly speaking, there will be quite substantial security and protection around 
the main Olympic venues of the kind that you would expect, and you will be 
seeing more detail about that nearer the time, but it will be not unlike what 
they did in China. (Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2008) 
 
London, however, introduces a slightly different dynamic to this Olympic security 
process as the city already boasts considerable experience in constructing sites of 
exorbitant security (inter alia Coaffee, 2009). In contrast to previous Games where 
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the Olympics were seen as a spur and justification for introducing and permanently 
retrofitting surveillance technologies, London is overtly building on its pre-existing 
expertise in crime prevention and counter-terrorism in securing the 2012 Games. 
 
Laminating Security Infrastructures: Building on London’s track record 
 
As Jennings and Lodge (2009) highlight, for Olympic-type events, security 
arrangements tend to layer over existing infrastructures (or at least those components 
that fit the standardized security framework). In the course of over a century of 
experiencing modern urban terrorism, London has a long history of piloting and 
subsequently bequeathing advanced surveillance strategies, particularly among its 
eastern, Olympic-focused territories (Fussey 2007). The city therefore has a mature 
security infrastructure onto which the 2012 programme will be grafted. Indeed, as the 
Olympics Minister, Tessa Jowell, has recently articulated, 2012-related security 
measures are rooted in the UK having "years of experience in both tackling terrorism 
and hosting major sporting and cultural events" (The Observer, 2009). 
 
Contrasting the experiences of many host cities (except possibly Atlanta) what is 
notable about the 2012 site is its development in the heart of an existing urban milieu; 
one that is densely populated, continually stereotyped through the discourse of 
‘dangerous spaces’ and the host to an overwhelming majority of UK counter-
terrorism related investigations. Whilst this segregation of Olympic and non-Olympic 
venues has been achieved at other Games (with the possible exception of Albertville’s 
sprawling terrain in 1992), this extant urban setting generates additional security 
challenges. Yet it is perhaps in this respect that London has a particular track record 
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in creating urban enclaves that whilst not physically gated, are symbolically and 
technologically demarcated from their surrounding environments. Two such examples 
are particularly prominent in the capital.  
 
High profile ‘spaces of exception’ 
Following the bombing of London’s financial heart in both 1992 and 1993 by the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), officials created a so-called ‘Ring of 
Steel’ which fomented a technologically delineated securitised zone predicated on 
monitoring and restricting access (Coaffee, 2004). Whilst target-hardening measures 
(such as security bollards and barriers) altered the urban landscape, it was camera 
surveillance that was viewed by Police as being the most important feature. An 
additional phase of expansion, intensification and ‘hardening’ subsequently occurred 
during the late 1990s with the introduction of Automatic Number Plate Recognition 
(ANPR cameras) and a substantial upgrading of existing camera provisions, rendering 
the ‘Square Mile’ area the most intensely monitored space in the UK (Coaffee, 2009), 
and, in likelihood, Europe. Yet, much of this expansion occurred during a time of 
reduced threat following the PIRA ceasefire prior to the Docklands bombing in 
February 1996. Here, the principle drivers were related to a desire to provide abstract 
(such as ‘reassurance’) as well as concrete indicators of security to abruptly hesitant 
investors, tenants and underwriters and avoid an exodus that could threaten London’s 
privileged position within global finance markets (Coaffee 2004). 
 
Similar principles were engaged and reproduced in the development of the capital’s 
second business and finance metropolis at Canary Wharf in London’s Docklands 
(situated geographically, if not socially or culturally, in the Olympic Borough of 
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Tower Hamlets). Following an averted PIRA bombing in 1992, and a realised attack 
in February1996, commercial tenants lobbied for a security cordon similar to the Ring 
of Steel initiated four miles to the west. This fortified landscape or ‘Iron Collar’ 
(Coaffee, 2004) was designed along similar security principles and for analogous 
reasons of reassurance and resilience. As highlighted below, such ‘rings of security’ 
bounded by ANPR cameras provide a template for Olympic security planning. 
 
Since the new Millennium these cameras have since crept across space and function 
across the city. ANPR now provides automated sentries around the city-centre 
perimeter to police London’s Congestion Charge. Further afield (and demonstrating 
the perennial ‘Janus face’ of surveillance – see Lyon, 1994) these cameras encircle 
the wider circumference of Greater London’s Low Emission Zone to force owners of 
high-polluting vehicles to be (substantially) charged for using the capital’s roads. 
Despite this diffusion, ANPR has noticeably converged eastwards with the Olympic 
Boroughs of Hackney (Wells, 2007) and Tower Hamlets (Coaffee et al., 2008) 
hosting particular concentrations. In the latter case, this technology is notably 
clustered around Canary Wharf’s islands of affluence (coincidentally hosting the 
headquarters of London’s Olympic planners) and its protective ‘Iron Collar.’ 
 
Surveillance 2.0 
Another strong commonality between these splintered spaces has been the use of 
advanced forms of technological surveillance to patrol their borders and interiors in 
addition to their broader deployment across the capital. Because these asocial and 
automated varieties have been previously comprehensively discussed generally (inter 
alia Lyon, 2003) and with reference to London (inter alia Coaffee, 2009; Fussey, 
	  	  
	  
84	  
2007), the most notable aspects are only briefly revisited here to enable two distinct 
points of analysis. First, we highlight the propensity for these measures to be 
deployed into what are generally the poorest areas of London, particularly the three 
‘Olympic Boroughs’ of Tower Hamlets, Newham and Hackney. Secondly, these 
measures constitute surveillance infrastructures that will be co-opted into the wider 
2012 security ensemble, particularly in relation to the more populated areas 
encircling, and external to, the Olympic Park in Newham. 
 
Most notable of these is Newham council’s deployment of Face Recognition CCTV 
(FRCCTV) throughout the 1990s. Widespread conventional surveillance camera 
coverage was introduced comparatively late into the area and is more prominently 
associated with one of the earlier attempts to regenerate Stratford (the heart of 2012-
related construction) during 1995’s Stratford City Challenge scheme. In an area that 
had been unable to escape the label of ‘dangerousness’ that has historically afflicted 
much of East London, this regeneration stimulated a large deployment of surveillance 
cameras. FRCCTV followed soon after with the introduction of 300 cameras into the 
area (The Guardian, 2002), arguably one of the first public space deployments of the 
technology. Officially installed to counter crime and terrorism, in actuality the 
cameras became operational during 1998, the same year as the ‘Good Friday 
Agreement,’ which effectively led to the demilitarisation of PIRA. Critics have also 
emphasised the lack of evidence supporting their effectiveness in tackling crime (see 
The Guardian, 2002). 
 
Other forms of second-generation surveillance strategies – particularly those designed 
to overcome fallible human attention spans by automatically ‘identifying’ phenomena 
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deemed suspicious – have also been tested on East Londoners prior to their wider 
diffusion. One notable example includes the Intelligent Passenger Surveillance (IPS) 
programme that automatically overlays live surveillance camera feeds onto ‘ideal’ 
images (such as an empty platform after a train has departed) and alerts of any 
‘suspicious discrepancies’ (such as discarded luggage) first piloted at Mile End 
Underground station (Tower Hamlets) during 2003. Another less-publicised example 
was the 2006 experimentation with private sector microphone-equipped cameras in 
Shoreditch (Hackney) to monitor activity surrounding its thriving night-time 
economy. Here, manufacturers claimed that they had developed algorithms to 
distinguish between human screams of pleasure and distress and could automatically 
alert camera operators to the latter (Wells, 2007) – a claim that convinced municipal 
‘CCTV Managers’ to allow it to be deployed into public spaces.  
 
Overall, this discussion has sought to illustrate the trend of deploying novel forms of 
technological surveillance into East London, particularly in those areas adjacent to the 
Olympic Park, and high profile areas of London more generally. These are the 
contexts and themes of London’s security practice onto which the global leitmotifs 
Olympic security standards must overlay. At the same time, the (current) £600m 2012 
security budget will generate further opportunities to intensify and embed these 
practices. As the following sections highlight, these trends may forge strong 
harmonies with the plans to protect the 2012 Games yet, simultaneously, may also 
create dissonance with some of the idiosyncrasies of policing London. 
 
Securing the 2012 London Olympics 
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The 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games will require the largest security 
operation ever conducted in the United Kingdom. The success of the Games 
will be ultimately dependant on the provision of a safe and secure 
environment free from a major incident resulting in loss of life. The challenge 
is demanding; the global security situation continues to be characterised by 
instability with international terrorism and organised crime being a key 
component. (Metropolitan Police Authority, 2007) 
 
For host cities, policing the Games is seen as an exercise in exceptionality. The above 
statement, quoted from a Metropolitan Police (the constabulary covering most of 
London, including the city’s Olympic venues) report on 2012 security planning 
demonstrates that this view is shared in London. Here, the scale and form of the 
project constitutes an unprecedented peace-time undertaking for the hosts. Of further 
interest is the primacy given to securing the Games from a cataclysmic terrorist 
attack. Indeed, the execution of the July 7th bombings a mere 20 hours after the IOC’s 
decision to award the thirtieth summer Olympiad to London has provided a lasting 
and symbolic connection between the 2012 Games and terrorist violence. Coupled 
with unprecedented expenditure following the relaunch of the UK Government’s 
counter-terrorist (CONTEST) strategy and its dominance in local security budgets, the 
threat of terrorism has become the prominent feature of 2012 security planning 
(Coaffee 2009). Such prioritisation is not only evident from the above planning 
document, it is unequivocally articulated in the consolidated London 2012 Olympic 
and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy: ‘the greatest threat to the security of the 
2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games is international terrorism’ (Home Office, 
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2009). Moreover, it is important to recognise how the primacy attributed to such 
concerns shapes the total security infrastructures deployed to secure the Olympics.  
 
Building on the aforementioned foundations, private contractors were invited to 
construct the substantive and detailed aspects of the strategy via a series of tenders 
from London’s Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) during 2007. The first round of 
these tenders enabled private sector projects to be collated into the consolidated 2012 
security plan developed and finalized during 2009 (Home Office, 2009) and thus 
makes it possible to identify the direction of resources within the wider strategy. More 
specifically, establishing contracts as early as 2007-2008 allowed them to be 
integrated into the projected Olympic construction programme. 
 
A central theme of this overall security plan was the continuation of London’s praxis 
of fragmenting urban spaces. This is perhaps most clearly articulated by the then 
Metropolitan Police security coordinator for the 2012 Games,’ proposed framework 
for 2012 resilience arrangements. Here, Assistant Commissioner Tarique Ghaffur 
articulated the need for the Games’ counter-terrorism plan to operate over a defined 
security ‘footprint’ (territory). In doing so, he evoked the City of London’s ‘Ring of 
Steel’ as an exemplar of such a security regime (Ghaffur, 2007), one that continues 
the ‘secure by design’ mantle informing many prior London developments including 
Heathrow Terminal Five, the Millennium Dome, Wembley and Lords Cricket 
Ground. The ODA tenders, designed to enable private security contractors to situate 
specific strategies within these policy frameworks, reinforce this point. Explicitly 
characterising the Olympic Park as a splintered ‘Island Site’ (ODA, 2007), and thus 
semantically confirming its geographical isolation, these tenders reveal ambitions for 
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technological apparatus to police its borders. In doing so, the ODA placed particular 
emphasis on procuring technological solutions for these ‘problem areas’ including 
‘ACS [access control systems] comprising RFID token and biometric[s]’, a 
‘combination of technology and physical searching’ and ‘CCTV, security lighting 
systems and intruder detection systems to be [established,] integrated with, and form a 
part of, the perimeter security’ (Ibid.). 
 
These measures also compliment more traditional forms of intra-city bordering. The 
Olympic park itself was ‘sealed’ in July 2007 and nearby public footpaths and 
waterways closed for public access. The encircling 11-mile blue fence - ‘cordon 
blue,’ which was put in place for ‘health and safety’ reasons, has been likened by 
some to the Belfast peace walls (The Guardian 2007). In 2009 this was replaced by 
electric fencing. Around the main venues and on the borders of the Olympic Park 
there has also been talk of setting up advanced screening access points – the so-called 
‘tunnel of truth’ which can check large numbers of people simultaneously for 
explosives, weapons and biohazards. Those creating this elaborate security ensemble 
are also not spared from its controlling features as biometric checks via advanced 
hand-scanners are routinely carried out on the construction workforce within the 
sealed site (inter alia The Observer, 2009). 
 
To manage this burgeoning assemblage, many disparate technological strategies are 
pulled together in the Metropolitan Police’s newly constructed Special Operations 
Room, a surveillance camera command centre in Lambeth, South London, 
inaugurated in 2007. This facility, the largest of its kind in the capital, was ostensibly 
designed to oversee the security of major events such as the Notting Hill Carnival and 
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large sporting events including the London Marathon and, ultimately, the Olympics. 
Building on notions of ‘nodal governance,’ this development potentially could be 
seen in terms of ‘nodal security.’ Drawing on Castells (2000) characterisation of 
nodes as the points of confluence for overlapping networks, ‘nodal governance’ has 
been developed as a conceptual tool to understand how these nodes then exert their 
influence (inter alia Burris et al., 2005). These sites have been characterized as 
comprising four features: mentalities (mechanisms for thinking about the governed 
subject/network); technologies (methods for exercising influence); resources (the 
means to enable its operation); and institutions (to marshal the mentalities, 
technologies and resources). The Lambeth control room serves as a conduit, arguably 
comprising these four elements, where surveillance footage from the control centres 
of 32 other London boroughs is filtered through. As the network expands, new nodes 
arise via the forthcoming development of two similar facilities, one in Hendon, North-
West London, and another in Bow, in the heart of the East End, close to the Olympic 
Park. Underlining the prominence of terrorism within this definition of ‘security’ is 
the integration of the Metropolitan Police’s ‘Gold Command’ (the largely terrorism-
focussed policing body with overall control of strategy and resources) into the 
strategic and operational management of this facility, their presence also enabling an 
ability to immediately seize control of the centre during any major incidents.  
 
Partly stimulated by fears of a spatially displaced terrorist attack, these technological 
security measures will also soak through the ‘island site’s’ borders and permeate the 
broader locality. As such, during Games time, London authorities will be using 
advanced surveillance to track suspects across the city including London’s ever 
expanding system of ANPR cameras. A RFID ticket trafficking system, which would 
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allow spectators to be tracked from their home (facilitated by the proposed combined 
entrance and transport ticket), has also been suggested. Towards the security epicentre 
in Stratford, a securitised traffic-free ‘buffer zone’ covering the areas to the south of 
the Olympic park, from West Ham and Plaistow, has already been approved – a 
development which may conflict with official declarations that the Games will foster 
community aggrandizement. Here, such controlled zones may conflict with the area’s 
deep-rooted traditions of (extreme laissez-faire) street trading. Additionally, 
restrictions on protest and assembly around Olympic sites enshrined in the London 
Olympic and Paralympic Games Act, 2006 (and likely to be policed by the 
aforementioned technologies) may potentially stifle another East End ritual: rebellion. 
 
In sum, the confluence of recent security trends in the capital alongside the particular 
aims of 2012 Olympic security programme creates a climate that elevates the 
prominence of technological surveillance strategies. Indeed, the ODA’s (2007) call 
for suppliers to offer strategies that ‘create an integrated security environment that is 
effective, discrete and proportionate’ echoes the IOC’s longstanding aim of projecting 
the Games as an athletic event and not an exercise in security. What is significant in 
the context of Olympic security is that ‘discretion’ and ‘proportionality’ have often 
translated into distanciated forms of technological control. This policy direction was 
further confirmed by the then head of the 2012 security strategy, Tarique Ghaffur, as 
follows: 
 
One of the main issues will be technology vs. people … An event of this scale 
means technology plays a bigger part in the look and feel of the games and 
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means surveillance will be a major issue that will likely cause debate. (Games 
Monitor, 2007) 
 
Cumulatively, these approaches both harmonise with the standard approaches to 
Olympic security outlined above and, also, reassert London’s tradition of applying 
technological strategies to ‘separated spaces’ to tackle crime, terrorism and other 
risks. 
 
Fanning the flame: security legacies 
One of the most frequently articulated concepts in relation to 2012 and a key 
determinant in London’s award of the Games is the issue of ‘legacy,’ particularly in 
terms of the post-event use of the Olympic site and attendant community regeneration 
schemes. This post-Games utility also extends to the machinery of security. Indeed, 
the aforementioned tenders for Olympic Park security providers are encouraging 
companies to supply ‘security legacy,’ thus bequeathing substantial mechanisms and 
technologies of control to the post-event site. Here, questions remain over the security 
priorities of a high profile international sporting event attended by millions of people 
and the degree of infrastructure that will remain to police a large urban parkland (the 
future incarnation of the Olympic site). Although for other mega-events, such as the 
2006 FIFA World Cup, the security legacy consisted of sustained networks of 
professionals rather than physical control measures (largely due to the deployment of 
mobile surveillance cameras) (Baasch, 2008), this post-event inheritance of security 
infrastructures is a common Olympic legacy. Indeed, the legacy of retained private 
policing following the Tokyo (1964) and Seoul (1988) Olympiads and the 
continuation of zero-tolerance style exclusion laws after the Sydney (2000) games are 
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a case in point. Private security providers have further expressed the view to the 
authors that the potential to engage in new markets and develop opportunities with the 
public sector after the Games is an additional, and perhaps more compelling, reason to 
engage in the Olympics project. Key here are the critical themes of legitimacy and 
control ‘creep.’ Furthermore, issues of citizenship and community (continually cited 
by the ODA as the main benefactors of the games) may also be called into question. 
 
The social configuration of post-Olympic spaces and their attendant demands for 
security are also important. A repeated corollary of large-scale 
redevelopment/regeneration projects generally (inter alia Sassen, 2001) and in 
London specifically (Hall, 2002; Imrie et al., 2009) has been to reinforce micro-
community level socio-economic segregation. In turn, the rebordered Olympic 
neighbourhood is likely to bring a host of new security demands, particularly for 
surveillance cameras, from the new inhabitants of its gentrified and splintered 
enclaves, as has traditionally been the case (inter alia Sennet, 1996; Bauman, 2000).  
 
Conclusion - Olympic Rings of Steel 
 
This chapter has argued that despite pluralities of threat and the diverse local 
topographies that shape them, strong commonalities can be observed across Olympic 
security operations over both time and place. These catalyse the institution of ‘total’ 
security ‘spaces of exception’ that are simultaneously standardised, transferable and 
mobile and potentially dislocated from their host environments. Although some 
localized security vernaculars inevitably penetrate their deployment (particularly 
given the importance of occupational cultures in delivering security, see inter alia 
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Reiner, 2000; Klauser, this volume), the overarching homogeneity of Olympic 
security arrangements necessarily impact unevenly on diverse host settings. Such 
asymmetries may relate to issues of efficacy, liberality and applicability. 
 
For London 2012 two additional processes are at play. First, future candidates have 
noted the currency given by the IOC to London’s emphasis on regenerative ‘legacies’ 
(see Rio 2016, 2007). Consequently, subsequent Olympics Parks are unlikely to 
become the suburban appendages of the past and, instead, become hosted within 
existing urban settings ripe for regeneration. The isolation and bordering of such 
spaces is likely to become more pronounced. At the same time, the flow of affluent 
migrants to the wider redeveloped areas may exacerbate demands to retain Olympic 
security infrastructures. Secondly, prior its Olympic bid, London already boasted a 
mature security infrastructure comprising key elements of standardised Olympic 
security. These include the symbolic and technological delineation of urban spaces 
and piloting advanced surveillance technologies. The £600m (and rising) London 
2012 security programme is therefore commencing from a different position than for 
many preceding Olympic cities and, as the current planning and tendering 
arrangements demonstrate, is therefore likely to comprehensively intensify and embed 
the capital’s security infrastructure.  
 
This Chapter has also argued that Olympic security programmes are largely 
predicated on externalised terrorist threats. The role of post-millennium tensions 
informed by partially knowable yet potentially catastrophic risks in shaping ‘total 
security’ paradigms also holds for London. Thus, Olympic risks are selectively and 
socially constructed. The extraction of this notion of threat from the wider canon of 
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(largely human-constructed) contemporary risks (see Beck, 1999) raises a number of 
final areas of reflection.  
 
Initially, there is potential that standardised security responses may fail to map onto 
the uneven local topographies of terrorist threats to London. To take the example of 
one prominent Olympic security component, surveillance cameras, in London they 
have been more potent in tackling right wing terrorism than, say, violent Jihadi 
extremism (Fussey, 2007). An additional consideration is the continual mutability 
within types of terrorist threat. Al Qaeda-inspired activity, for example, has 
continually shifted from its pre 9/11 (more networked) form and ‘post-Taliban’ 
arrangements and is likely to be different in 2012 from what it is at the time of 
writing. 
 
Accounting for broader social harms generated by the hosting of mega-events further 
complicates this dynamic. A key issue here is how these (perhaps more routine) 
harms risk being downplayed by the emphasis on terrorism. Empirical work has 
demonstrated that hosting mega-events can routinely generate low and mid-level 
offences (Decker et al., 2007) as well as organised criminal activity, particularly those 
of high exploitation (Fussey and Rawlinson, 2009). Indeed, Fussey and Rawlinson’s 
(2009) ongoing ethnographic research into organised crime in East London ahead of 
the Games, has yielded data revealing the increased mobility (and reduced 
detectability) of the area’s sex industry; transferability of skills as established 
organised criminal elements enter and consolidate positions in this market; and the 
establishment of new trans-ethnic coalitions as nodal points to facilitate the industry. 
Other data from this research reveals the exploitation and theft from vulnerable 
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migrant workers operating below sub-contractor level on construction projects in East 
London (as part of the wider Olympic-related regeneration programme, although not 
connected to the actual Olympic Park). In turn, this has generated pathways into the 
second economy as a strategy of economic survival alongside recourse to violent 
groups to address fiscal disputes. 
 
As such, numerous criminogenic dynamics may be observed in relation to hosting the 
Olympics. Here, long-standing recognition that global processes impact on local 
criminal practices – such as the creation of new entrepreneurially-oriented territories 
of criminality (inter alia Hobbs, 2001) – are germane. Hosting mega-events such as 
the Olympics accelerate these global processes – including the reweighting of local 
economies towards (legal and illegal) consumer, leisure and service-oriented markets 
and their myriad environmental, social and cultural impacts – that, in turn, agitate and 
impel the development of new criminogenic contexts. Moreover, borrowing from 
Bauman (1998), such partially-visible movements can be seen to impact hidden, 
vulnerable and transitory populations most acutely and, for those it relocates, 
mobilises their delineation into protected tourists or policed vagabonds. 
 
At present surveillance-related security dominates security planning for London 2012 
given concerns about the threat of international terrorism. Yet the current and long 
term impact of non-terrorist criminality, already a significant feature of the Olympic 
host communities, is likely to grow significantly. Come 2012, the Olympic security 
operation put in place to protect the Olympic family during the Games – so called 
customer sensitive security – will be intricately blended with strategies which seek to 
regenerate local communities by upgrading housing, public places and community 
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infrastructures and legacy security from the Games. Whereas some elements of the 
Olympic ‘rings of steel’ may dissipate in the post-Games era, what remains of the 
security infrastructure is likely to have significant impact upon everyday life in East 
London. 
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